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Abstract
In a number of competitive sports the score of each
participant is decided by averaging the grades given by each
judge in a panel of judges. We characterize the sets of Nash
and strong Nash equilibria of the n-person noncooperat i ve
games induced by the average and the truncated average
functions .
Key words ; Nash equilibrium, Strong Nash equilibrium,
Committee voting, Average function
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1. Introduction
In a number of competitive sports the score of each
participant is decided by a panel of judges. Every
competitor's performance is assigned a numerical value by
each judge and these grades are incorporated by a
prespecified rule into a single number which serves as the
participant's score.
Two functions which are used extensively to aggregate the
grades reported by the judges into a single score, are the
average function and the truncated average function ( the
average of all the numbers without the maximum and minimum
values). E.g., the truncated average function is used in
judging the competition in gymnastics (see [3]), and diving
(see[5]), while the average function is used in grading the
competitors in synchronized swimming when the number of
judges is three (see[6]).
It is widely recognized that the average function is open
to manipulation by "sophisticated" judges. Namely, by
misrepresenting his true opinion, a judge may increase or
reduce the score of a given competitor. Thus, the decision
| process induces an n-person game among the judges.
Apparently, the truncated function was adopted by some
organizations as an aggregation rule, in an attempt to
curtail strategic behavior and force judges to vote
truthfully.
Here we consider a general case in which a committee has
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to assign a numerical value to a given alternative. Each
committee member submits a single numerical value, and the
submitted numbers are incorporated by a prespecified rule
into a single number. This number serves as the value the
committee assigns to the alternative.
In this article we investigate properties of the n-person
games induced when the weighted average function and the
truncated average function are used as the aggregation rules,
and committee members derive (directly or indirectly)
satisfaction from the committee's choice.
It should be noted that we do not discuss here the
purpose of the number assigned to an alternative and how it
may be used. Thus, we consider only the strategic behavior
arising from the choice process itself, and we do not
consider strategic behavior across alternatives.
We first investigate stability properties of the games as
represented by the Nash equilibrium when the committee
members are assumed to behave noncooperatively, and by the
strong Nash equilibrium when members may collude and
coordinate their choices. Then we examine whether these two
functions elicit truthful behavior by the players.
The results presented here are of interest both because
they constitute an interesting example of games with strong
Nash equilibria, and because of their practical implications.
2
.
Definitions
Let N be a set of n players. We will denote an n-person
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noncooperative game as a 2n+l tuple ( S]_ , . . . ,Sn ;F; v^ , . . . , vn )
where Sj_ is the strategy set of player i, F is the function
or mechanism which decides the outcome of the game, defined
on the n-dimensional strategy space, and v^ is the i-th
player utility or value function defined on the outcomes of
the game. A strategy profile X is an n-dimensional vector in
which the i-th component, Xj_, is the strategy of player i.
If profile Y is such that for every i^ j , Yi=Xi and yj=y, we
denote it as Y=(X]y)j. A strategy profile X is said to be a
Nash eguilibrium of the game, if for every player i and every
strategy y in Sif vi (F(X) ) <vi (F( (X | y) i )
)
,
( see Nash[ 4 ] ) . ( In
this article we assume that each player desires to minimize
his value function, and we also consider only pure strategy
eguilibria.) A coalition , is a subset of the player set. A
strategy profile X is said to be a strong Nash equilibrium
,
if for no coalition C there exists a strategy Y such that:
for every player i not in C, Yi=Xj_, for every player j in C,
Vj (F(Y) )<Vj (F(X) ) and for at least one player k in C,
vk (F(Y) )<vk (F(X) ) , (see Aumann [1]).
In the games discussed here each strategy set is an
interval I in R, and all are assumed to be identical.
Namely, each player chooses and reports a number from the
same interval. Four different types of intervals are
considered: i=(-oo,<x>), i=[l,U], I=[L,°°), and I=(-°°,U].
In addition, let tj_ be the number that player i wants the
committee to assign to the alternative. We assume that the
value function v^, of each player i, is a strictly increasing
function of the absolute value of the difference between the
game's outcome t and tj_. For simplicity we assume:
v i (t)=|t-t i |
.
Thus, each t-j_ completely describes the corresponding value
function. (Although the validity of these value functions is
not discussed here, it should be noted that the above class
of value functions represents a class of the well known
single peaked preferences (see Black[2].).
Without loss of generality we may assume that t^< ...<tn ,
with t^<tn .
Let A(X) be the weighted average function
,
A(X)=EWiXi , where n>2, w^>0, and Ew;=l.
i=l
Let TA(X) be the truncated average function
,
TA(X)=( EXj-Mx-mx) / (n-2) , where n>3, Mx=max{X| ] ieN}
1=1
and mx=min{x-j_ ! ieN} . Namely, TA(X) is the average of the
strategies Xj_ without (one of) the largest and smallest
reported numbers.
Let G^ and G2 be the games in which the outcome function
F is A and TA respectively.
3 . Stability
The attraction of the Nash and strong Nash eguilibria as
solutions for games stems from the stability they introduce
into the game. If no equilibrium exists, then time and
resources may be wasted by the players in attempting to
outwit their rivals, and to create coalitions that will
benefit them. Once it is known to a player that the rest of
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the players will follow their Nash strategies, this player
has the incentive to play his Nash strategy. If in addition,
the solution is also a strong Nash, then there is no
incentive to create coalitions. Thus, time and resources are
saved.
We first investigate the existence of equilibria for the
game G^ . The following proposition demonstrates that not
every game G^ has an equilibrium.
Proposition 1.
If I=( -00,00) then no Nash equilibrium exists for the game
G l •
Proof
:
Suppose there exists an equilibrium point X for G^. Then
without loss of generality there exists a player j such that
tj<A(X). Let 6=A(X)-tj and let y=Xj-6/wj, then A( (Xjy) j )=tj
.
Since Vj ( tj )<Vj ( A(X) ) , a contradiction is reached. QED
The nature of the results changes once I is
restricted. Not only do Nash equilibrium points exist, but
each one of them is also a strong Nash. In the following
discussion we may assume, without loss of generality, that
L<t
x
<.
. .<tn<U, and that L=0, U=l (when they exist). Let Yj
be the profile in which Xj_=0 for i=l,...,j and Xj_=l for
i=j+l,...,n. Let aj=A(Yj), and let m=max{ieN j ti<ai}
.
Proposition 2.
a. If the strategy set I is either [L,«>), (-°°,U], or
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[L,U] then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game G]_
.
b. Every Nash equilibrium of G-]_ is also a strong Nash
equilibrium.
Proof:
a. Consider the following cases.
i. I=[0,°°) . Let X=(o, . . . ,o,tn/wn ) , then A(X)=tn . Notice that
for every player j, tj<tn . Clearly, no player j for which
tj=tn , can improve the value of the game's outcome for
himself. Let player k be such that tk<tn . If player k
replaces his strategy in X with strategy y, then y>0 and
therefore A((X|y) k )>tn and vk (A(X| v ) k ) ) >vk (
t
n ) . Hence X is
an equilibrium.
ii. I=(-°°,l] . Let X=( (ti-Ew^ )/wi,l, . . . ,1) , then A(X)=ti. The
i=2
proof that X is an equilibrium is similar to the proof of
part i.
iii. I = [0,1], and tm4.]_>am . Let X=Ym , then A(X)=am . It is easy
to prove that X is a Nash equilibrium.
iv. I = [0,1], and tnH-l <anr Let X=( Ym ] x) m+ ]_ where x is such
that A(X)=tm+ ^. Notice that such an x exists since
am+l <tm+l <am' anc* A is a continuous function of the strategy
of player m+1. Again, it is simple to check that X is a Nash
equilibrium.
b. To prove that any Nash equilibrium in G]_ is also a
strong Nash equilibrium, let assume that X is a Nash
equilibrium and that there exists a coalition C of players
and a profile Z such that: for every i£C, Zi=x-j., for every
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ieC, Vj_(A(Z) )<Vj_(A(X) ) , and there exists at least one player
k in C such that vk ( A( Z) )<vk ( A(X) ) . Without loss of
generality, let assume that A(Z)>A(X). This indicates that
for every member i in C, tj_>A(X) , and that there exists at
least one member 1 in C such that Z]_>X]_. Then
A( (X j z) i) >A(X) , and because of the continuity of A, there
exists some y^, X]_<y]_<z^, such that V]_( A(X]y)]_)<V]_( A(X) ) ,
contradicting the assumption that X is a Nash equilibrium.
QED
The difference between games G-j_ and G2 is illuminated
immediately by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.
For every game G2 , there exists at least one Nash
equilibrium .
Proof:
Consider any profile X such that for every player i, Xj_=y
for some y in I. Clearly X is a Nash equilibrium, since for
any player i and any strategy z, TA( (X| z) j_)=TA(X) . QED
Thus, G2 always has many equilibria. In the following
proposition we identify all the strong Nash equilibria of G2.
Proposition 4.
A strategy profile X is a strong Nash equilibrium of G2
if and only if:
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I. I=(-°°,l], and X=(xj_, . . . ,x^,l, . . . ,Mx) such that x^=mx,
tl<TA(X)=t2=. . .=tk, or
II. I = [0,°°) and X=(mx,0, . .
.
jOjX^+i, . .
.
,xn ) such that xn=Mx,
TA(X)=tk+1 =...=t n _ 1 <t n , or
III. 1= [0,1] and X=(mx, , . . . ,0 ,xk+1 , . . . ,xk+ ]_,l, . . . , l,Mx)
such that TA(X)=t^+ ]_=. . ,=t)c+ ]_.
Proof
:
a. We first prove that a profile X satisfying any one of
the above defined conditions is a strong Nash equilibrium.
I. Suppose I = (-°°,l] and X is as defined in case (I).
It is easy to verify that X is a Nash equilibrium. If X is
not a strong Nash equilibrium, then there exists a coalition
C and a profile Z such that for every player i not in C,
z i=x i' anc* such that for every player i in C,
v^ (TA( Z) ) <Vj_(TA(X) ) with at least one player j for which
Vj (TA(Z) )<Vj (TA(X) ) . Clearly none of players 2 to k is in C.
If TA(Z)>TA(X), then player 1 is not in C and for at least
one player j among players k+1 to n, zj>xj=1, which is
impossible. Therefore TA(Z)<TA(X) and only player l is in C,
but then X is not a Nash equilibrium, a contradiction.
The proofs for cases II and III follow similar lines and
are omitted.
b. We now prove that if X is a strong Nash equilibrium
of G2 it must satisfy the above definition.
I. Let I=(-«,i] and let X be a strong Nash. Clearly
TA(X)=t2, and x^=mx. This, since players 1 and 2 can collude
and force it. If only tn >t2, then any xn=Mx is an
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equilibrium strategy for player n. Otherwise, for every
player i such that tj_>t2 it must be Xj_=l, which completes the
proof.
The proofs of cases II and III follow similar lines and
are omitted. QED
How the sets of equilibrium points of the games G^ and G2
relate to each other is still an open question. Clearly some
of the equilibria of the G^ game are not equilibrium points
of the corresponding G2 game. For example, if
X=(0, . .
.
,0,tn/wn ) is an equilibrium of G]_ and tn_^>0, then X
is not an equilibrium of G2
•
4. Truthful Choice
The above results indicate that the profile ( t]_ , . . . , tn )
is rarely a Nash equilibrium of either G]_ or G2 . Thus,
participants in such games usually will not report their true
choice values. Are there rules, besides the trivial
dictatorial rules, which will cause ( t^ , . . . . ,
t
n ) to be an
equilibrium in the induced game? (Notice that here we impose
only the nondictatorial requirement on the choice function.
For a detailed analysis of requirements and properties of
choice functions for committees see Peleg[7] for example.)
In the following discussion, for simplicity's sake, let
I n=2k+l for some integer k>0. Let M be the median of the set
{Xj_} (namely, there are k reported numbers in the profile X
which are not as large as M, and k reported numbers which are
at least as large as M) . Define the median function M(X) as
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M(X)=M, and let G 3 be the game induced by M(X). Then:
Proposition 5.
The profile T=( t^ , . . . ,
t
n ) is a Strong Nash equilibrium of
the game G3
.
Proof
:
Suppose there exists a coalition C and a profile X such
that for every player i not in C, xi =t i/ f° r every player j
in C, Vj (M(X) )<Vj (M(T) ) , and for at least one player k in C
vk (M(X) )<vk (M(T) )
.
Without loss of generality assume, M(X) >tk+ ]_ , (notice
that tk+ 2_=M) . This indicates that for every player i in C,
ti- tk+l' and xi- tk+l- This implies M(X)=M(T), and a
contradiction is reached. QED
Actually, T is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.
Namely, tj_ is the best strategy for player i to follow,
independently of the actions of the other players. Thus, we
may conclude that the median function elicits truthful voting
from the players.
5 . Conclusions
In this article we identified and characterized all the
strong Nash equilibria of the games induced by the average
and the truncated average functions. As a result we may
conclude that rarely is it in the best interest of
participants in these games to report their true choices.
Thus, if indeed the objective in using the truncated average
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function rather then the regular average function, is to
elicit truthful voting from committee members, then this
objective is not achieved.
We also demonstrated that the median function is an
aggregation rule which elicits truthful voting by the
participants.
The implications of the above results will be reported in
future work.
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